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The Development of the Developmental State in Africa: A Theoretical 
Inquiry1 
 
Howard Stein2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The conceptualization of the African state-development nexus has gone through 
enormous vicissitudes in the post-independence period. This has included the view 
of the state as a facilitator of foreign investment in the early post-independent 
period, to the state-centric mode where the state was both vehicle and recipient of 
development in the 60s and 70s to the neo-liberal mode of the 80s and 90s where 
an overreaching state was perceived as the impediment to development and the 
minimalist state as the solution.   
 
While these intellectual approaches had various influences on and connections to 
the actual evolution of African states, the growing asymmetry between domestic 
and bilateral and multilateral sources of finance has increasingly shaped the state in 
the image of the predominant paradigm. The state has become both subject and 
predicate particularly in the 1980s and 90s when the interstices for alternative 
strategies were greatly reduced by the collusive singularity of the criteria behind 
bilateral, multilateral and commercial sources of external finance. 
 
In this paper, I would like to focus less on the history of the theory of the African 
state and more on the problematic conceptual roots underlying the theoretic view of 
the state-developmental nexus which has dominated thinking in the past two 
decades. It is my contention that this neo-classical generated view of the state has 
not only led to enormous intellectual retrogression on a theoretical level, but huge 
opportunity costs associated with a misplaced allocation of resources and a 
distempered state which has been both bloated in the service of the short-termism 
of misconceived conditionality and emasculated relative to longer term 
developmental exigencies.   
 
After critically reviewing the theory and experience of the African state under 
structural adjustment, I will turn to an alternative approach based on a theory of the 
developmental state where the state is perceived as an embedded vehicle of 
development. The second section of the paper will begin with a critical assessment 
of the literature on the developmental state, followed by an inquiry into the 
theoretical roots of the developmental state. The exigencies of the state at a 
theoretical level are presented as an agent of structural and institutional 
transformation. In this context, the market is perceived as an institution. As 
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opposed to viewing the state as a vehicle attempting to correct market 
imperfections so that some hypothetical static pareto efficient point is created at a 
moment in space and time, the state is presented as a agent which aims at 
promoting market formation and maturation. Markets then are perceived as 
purposive, multileveled and socially and economically embedded. The final section 
of the paper looks at the political economy of the development state by critically 
examining the arguments posed against the possibility of a development state in 
Africa. 
 
THE THEORETICAL ROOTS OF THE STATE UNDER ADJUSTMENT 
The original construction of SAPs was born out of neo-liberal convictions which 
placed the primacy of markets over all other institutions. The initial design of 
SAPS was based “on a particularly optimistic view about the efficacy of the market 
mechanism as a vehicle for the promotion of efficiency and development, including 
misconceptions about the prevalence of institutional pre-conditions for market 
efficiency” (Aryeetey and Tarp forthcoming). 
 
Governments and markets are depicted as opposing forces in economic 
development. In particular, it is argued that there is little role for the former in 
resource allocation and the ability of government intervention in resolving market 
failures and imperfections is very much doubted. Rather, the proponents of 
adjustment view the danger of government (state) failure as paramount. 
Government intervention is regarded as a most damaging source of distortion to the 
operation of markets. Hence, they conclude that governments should be 
“minimalist” in their outlook, i.e. guarantors of private property rights and 
macroeconomic stability.  
 
Their position on the role of governments is in turn a reflection of their perception 
of the nature of the state. According to the public/ rational choice school, the state 
is essentially seen as predatory - a rent generating institution that inhibits the 
efficient allocation of resources. In Africa, it is argued that the predatory nature of 
the state is linked to the way rents are distributed, i.e. through the rationing of 
divisible benefits on the basis of favoritism to buy the political support or appease 
various interest groups (Bates 1981 and 1983).  Furthermore, with the weak tax-base, 
the predatory state impedes the actions of private agents, e.g. as a vehicle of income 
extraction. Responding to such government behavior, the private agents refrain from 
making risky, forward-looking investments. 
 
For example, Bates (1991) argues that a system of discretionary taxes or selective 
subsidization emerges from the need of governments to buy support. Adam and 
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O'Connell (1997) also argue that African governments have sacrificed broad-based 
economic development for other, more venal objectives. Governments are captured 
by a favored group and they tend to use discretionary taxation to make transfers to 
themselves or their supporters. Since the Berg Report, the public/rational choice 
school has been very influential in forming the view of African states. This 
minimalist view of the state was uncritically adopted as an integral component of 
Structural Adjustment Programs. 
 
It should be noted here, however, that the sharply dichotomous view of the role of 
the state and markets and the open ‘anti-statism’ which has dominated the design of 
the core adjustment model, has long been regarded as a rather extreme position 
within the spectrum of mainstream economists. In macroeconomics, for example, 
the presence and efficacy of the `Invisible Hand’ in equating aggregate supply with 
aggregate demand has been a focal point in the debate between the Monetary and 
the Keynesian Schools. Indeed, in the Neo-classical Synthesis a la Malinvaud, a 
Walrasian equilibrium is correctly identified as a special case among other 
disequilibrium macro conditions more commonly prevailing in the real world.  
 
However, the roots can be found in neo-classical economics. The microfoundations of 
the theories that underpin conditionality misspecify the nature of African economies 
including the role and nature of the state. All the major theories of adjustment have a 
common set of sub-components. From these precepts, a series of intermediate 
propositions form a base on which the cogency of the theories either stand or fall.  
Before discussing the specificity of the nature of the misconceptualization, we need to 
identify the methodological sub-components of adjustment. 
 
There are five neo-classical economic sub-components I believe are at the core of the 
methodology embedded in adjustment theories: homo-economicus, rational 
deductivity, methodological individualism, axiomatic reasoning and the acceptance 
of equilibrium as a natural state. At the heart of all the theories is homo-economicus, 
which posits a rationally calculating individual, maximizing his or her welfare. This 
concept incorporates a mode of rationality which is instrumental, where actors make 
choices which best satisfy a person's objectives. In the strictest neo-classical version, 
homo-economicus lives in a world of perfect certainty where the future is fully 
described and people completely grasp the potential consequences of their choices.   
 
The model relies entirely on methodological individualism. The starting point begins 
with choices at the individual level and the end point is the maximization of the 
welfare of the individual. In the economy you have two types of participants: 
consumers and producers. Consumerus-economicus chooses bundles of goods which 
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maximizes his or her utility subject to budget constraints. Firma-economicus makes 
production choices which maximize the efficiency of the output of the company. In 
this world the future implications of their choices are understood, all technology types 
are readily available and information is costless.  
 
Still what is missing in the analysis is the mechanism of producers and consumer 
interaction which leads to choices which are welfare maximizing. Markets, in this 
context, are perceived as exchanges where goods and services are transferred from 
producers to consumers. Exchange in the neo-classical model arises spontaneously 
from the atomistic interaction of self-seeking individuals. Goods traded in every 
market are assumed to be homogenous so that prices provide the only information 
needed to make the decisions on production and purchasing. No individual has 
sufficient market power to affect the market price. Markets must exist for all goods 
and services for now and in the future so that individuals can make completely 
informed rational decisions based on perfect information. Finally, to ensure that 
equilibrium is reached, neo-classicals posit the existence of a Walrasian auctioneer 
who gathers and processes the information from all these markets so that individual 
agents through a tatonnement or groping process can adjust their decisions to remove 
excess demand and supply from all markets. The result will be that pareto optimal 
conditions will be reached thereby maximizing the welfare of society (no one will be 
able to be better off without making someone worse off).    
 
Equilibrium arises in the sense that the market is clearing and optimal choices are 
made. Moreover, in this ideal world, unfettered markets normally will lead to 
indicators that reflect scarcity and choice. Decisions based on markets under these 
conditions will lead to efficient choices on what and how to produce that are 
indicative of the endowment of societal resources. Thus the outcome is consistent 
with the natural underlying conditions. Equilibrium is a natural state.3 The thinking 
behind the model is also rational deductive and axiomatic. It is rational-deductive in 
the sense that the behavior of agents is predetermined by a set of rules which are 
deductively posited. Rational predictable behavior will arise from a set of market 
signals. Axiomatically, consumers and private producers are presupposed to be utility 
and profit maximizers that rationally respond in an efficient manner, if the market 
signals are correct.    
 
The reliance on an axiomatic approach in neo-classical economics is particularly 
problematic methodologically.4 Economists working in this framework begin with a 
series of axioms and generate policy initiatives which are applied to concrete 
historical conditions. When policies have not worked it is generally because non-
economic variables have subverted the process. Policy variations are possible within a 
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narrow realm, but since the basic body of theory arises from a set of axioms there is 
no alteration of the basic abstract theoretical level. In essence, the theoretical level is 
cut off from concrete historical experiences. The concrete can only be used to affirm 
the theoretical realm not to reject it (the character of an axiom).5 
 
The axiomatic presupposition of the behavior of private actors in the economy leads 
neo-classical theorists to focus on other explanations of why economies are not 
operating at optimal levels. In essence if the results of the interplay of rational actors 
does not lead to the predictable outcome in must be because something has distorted 
the signals or there are actors motivated by utility considerations to make decisions 
which are economically inefficient (e.g. politics in Bob Bates’s work). The search for 
culpability leads to the identification of players influencing markets from outside the 
realm of exchanges.  The reasoning leads ineluctably to the role of the state and how 
it affects the economy.   
 
In its pure form, neo-classical economics does not recognize any role for states. The 
view arises out of the general equilibrium foundations of neo-classical economic 
theory. As we have seen, economies are driven by exchanges which arise out of the 
spontaneous interaction of self-seeking individuals. In the more relaxed version there 
is some recognition that property rights are transferred in exchanges and therefore 
there is the need for some external guarantor such as a judiciary. There is also some 
recognition that money is needed in exchanges as a means of payment which sets the 
preconditions for monetary institutions such as a central bank tightly controlling 
credit creation. Like the guarantor of property rights, it should also only be neutral by 
using objective criteria like the monetary rule. Two principles arise from this model: 
the imperatives of state neutrality and the need for state minimalism. As we will see 
below, two of the neo-classical elements underlying adjustment are the theories of 
public choice and rational choice which draw on methodological individualistic 
explanations of the behavior of acquisitive homo-economicus using the vehicle of the 
state for predatory purposes.   
 
Much of adjustment is driven by the principle of creating state neutrality and 
minimalism in the belief that once prices reflect their scarcity values the real sector 
will respond accordingly. Companies have been operating with allocative and 
technological inefficiencies because of state ownership and the regulation of 
production and due to the government-produced distortions in exchange rates, interest 
rates and commodity and labor prices. Thus enormous static efficiency gains can arise 
from liberalization, privatization and stabilization. Instead of viewing development as 
a process of structural and institutional transformation, the focus is on the creation of 
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a static equilibrium state where rational private actors make marginal changes in 
reaction to undistorted prices that maximize their individual utility. 
 
THE WORLD BANK AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF 
THE STATE UNDER ADJUSTMENT 
As I indicated above, the World Bank’s early conception of the nature of the state 
was heavily influenced by the neo-classical theory of the state. Strictly speaking, as 
we have seen above, in the pure neo-classical model as represented by Walrasian 
equilibrium there is no need for a state since society's welfare is maximized. In the 
less extreme model of structural adjustment, the state is the guarantor of property 
rights and the money supply. Implicit in this notion is that the state will benignly 
intervene in these matters. State intervention in any other words sets up the 
opportunity for predacity and is less superior than the operation of the market.6 
 
Public choice and rational choice theories dominated this view of the state. One of the 
great paradoxes of structural adjustment in the 1980s in Africa, widely observed by 
proponents and critics alike, was that the state was the primary focus of criticism by 
the Bank and Fund for Africa's ills as well as their major vehicle of policy delivery.  
The pattern of the 1980s was to conditionally tie credit tranche allocations to civil 
service retrenchment targets. The ostensible reason was that this would help reduce 
government budget deficits and allow the country to meet IMF credit targets.  
However, implicit in this policy was a rather erroneous presumption that cutting back 
on "bloated" bureaucracies would somehow diminish the dysfunctional nature of state 
intervention while "freeing up" scarce human resources for the private sector.   
 
Beginning with the 1989 report on sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 1989), the Bank 
through a series of papers, memoranda and public pronouncements began to move 
away from the state retrenchment approach. In a 1993 speech, Edward Jaycox, the 
former V.P. for Africa, admitted that the state retraction strategy simply "ha[d]n't 
worked" (Jaycox 1993, p.26). Money had not been saved and laid off labor had not 
stimulated economic growth instead increasing social dislocations and 
unemployment. Dia (1993) argued in another Bank document that the act of 
retrenchment seriously undermined the already problematic operational capacity of 
African states by often retiring the most experienced personnel, limiting the entry of 
youthfully energetic and inexpensive new recruits, and compressing and reducing 
wages making the civil service unattractive to the most talented people while 
generating apathy and discontent. Moreover other Bank policies have undermined 
state capacities. Jaycox pointed to the thinning affect of lending policies on 
indigenous capacity, which have been introduced without regard to their impact. He 
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criticizes the Bank's use of expatriate resident technical assistance as a "destructive 
force" undermining capacity building in Africa (Jaycox 1993, p.21).   
 
A further development of Bank thinking became evident with the release of the 
Bank's 1992 publication Governance and Development (World Bank 1992). To the 
Bank, good governance means a state that is accountable in the sense of "holding 
public officials responsible for their actions" (p.13); a legal framework which is 
known, in force, where one has binding resolution of legal disaccord by independent 
judicial bodies and proper procedures for amending rules" (p.5) and the improved 
information and transparency in government to reduce corruption and explain policy 
choices (p.39). Mamadou Dia (1993) picks up these themes to explain the poor 
governance in Africa.  To Dia it can be explained by the existence of patrimonialism 
which exhibits a pattern which is contrary to governance which would encourage 
development. Patrimonialism is a system of leadership characterized by the 
unwillingness of rulers to distinguish between personal and public property. In the 
patrimonial state political and personal loyalty are awarded more than merit.  
Following Governance and Development, the patrimonial state is one that lacks 
accountability, transparency and the rule of law (World Bank 1992).  
 
The policy implications of this rethinking were bifurcated into two rather different 
directions: one was to build capacity while the other was to improve governance. On 
capacity, we have a set of very concrete proposals as represented by February, 1994 
Capacity Building Report (World Bank 1994), Edward Jaycox's speech of 1993 
(Jaycox 1993) and (Ali 1994). On the other hand we have the three approaches to 
improve governance in patrimonial states, the comprehensive, enclave and hybrid 
solutions suggested by Mamadou Dia (1993), which Rogerio Pinto (1994) attempts to 
operationalize using the example of the Gambia.   
 
While the attempt to develop a deeper understanding of the exigencies of the African 
state has been highly welcome the effort has been conceptually flawed due partly to a 
continued reliance on neo-classical microfoundations. What is not clear in either the 
governance or capacity building endeavors are the "indicators of success". A very 
detailed study of the governance project in The Gambia (Pinto 1994) clearly shows 
that the project was amounting to a series of organizational shifts. How does one 
evaluate whether these shifts are consistent with the decline of patrimonialism?  Part 
of the problem is quantifying what is a qualitative analysis. The questionnaire used to 
evaluate the perception of patrimonialism is not always clearly connected to the 
theory of patrimonialism. On question 15, respondents are asked to consider the 
statement that public investment is characterized by "low productivity" (Pinto 1994, 
p.74). One asks, relative to what? It is not clear what exactly is being measured by 
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these questions nor what it would mean if perceptions shifted. Characterizations 
presuppose a common definitional base.  
 
Part of the problem relates to the concept of institutions embedded in the capacity and 
governance projects. As Mehdi Ali puts it in his paper, institutional capacity in the 
context of government is defined as "the restructuring of public sector management 
toward more efficient and effective performance" (Ali 1994, p.2). The view of 
institutions is basically functionalist and leads to the problematic notion that 
organizational shifts can somehow improve the efficiency of the operation of states.  
A more fruitful conceptualization would arise using a Veblenian perspective we 
discussed above, one that sees institutions as less instrumental and more as "settled 
habits of thought common to the generality of men and women". The key is shifting 
the pattern of norms of behavior that arise from a different set of self-conceptualizing 
tools. Dia (1993) comes the closest to comprehending this in his depiction of the 
norms of behavior in the patrimonial state but then falls into a functionalist mode by 
adopting the rather flawed concepts of accountability, transparency and the rule of 
law found in the Bank's Governance and Development (World Bank 1992).7  
 
Moreover, if we had accountability, transparency and the rule of law, would we have 
a vibrant developing economy in Africa?  It is doubtful. The logic in some senses is 
an extension of the "getting the prices right" position at the heart of adjustment in 
Africa. It follows the general neo-classical notion of institutional neutrality discussed 
above that will permit an unimpeded space for optimal private decision making. 
Passively create the conditions perceived as inducing private production and 
investment and "ye will come".   
 
This leads to a final related point which focuses on the underlying purpose of the 
governance and capacity building projects. As we have argued, the World Bank and 
IMF still focus on implementing a core adjustment model. In other words, 
governance and capacity for what?  The capacity and governance issues have become 
paramount due to the very problematic experience with adjustment in Africa over the 
last two decades. In the Bank's view, the vehicle of delivery must be upgraded and 
improved if adjustment is to work. In general, the Bank’s approach to the state, 
including its shift away from state retrenchment, is conceptually problematic and 
incapable of understanding the exigencies of the state and development in Africa. If 
East Asia is any guide it will take a much more proactive or developmental state. 
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THE THEORY OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
The seminal work on the developmental state was presented in the final chapter of 
Chalmers Johnson’s 1982 work “MITI and the Japanese Miracle”. Johnson presents 
four components of his model of the developmental state: 
 
1) The first element of the model is the existence of a small, inexpensive but elite 
state bureaucracy staffed by the best managerial talent available in the system. 
2) The second element…is a political system in which the bureaucracy is given 
sufficient scope to take initiative and operate effectively. 
3) The third element is the perfection of market-conforming methods of state 
intervention in the economy. 
4) A fourth and final element of the model is a pilot organization like MITI. 
 
The concept of market conforming was not meant to be simply a “market friendly” 
approach in the World Bank East Asian Miracle sense, where governments should 
“ensure adequate investment in people, provide a competitive climate for private 
enterprise, keep the economy open to international trade and maintain a stable 
macroeconomy” (World Bank, 1993, p.10). By hindsight, Johnson would consider 
this to be a “regulatory” or “market rational” state where “the state concerns itself 
with the forms and procedures - the rules - if you will of economic competition, but 
it does not concern itself with substantive matters” (Johnson, 1982, p.19).8 In 
contrast the market is seen as a tool which is deliberately used for broader 
developmental purposes.  In a recent article revisiting the developmental state, 
Johnson makes this quite explicit in his criticisms of those that dichotomize states 
and markets.  “Industrial policy is not an alternative to the market but what the state 
does when it intentionally alters incentives within markets in order to influence the 
behavior of civilian producers, consumers and investors…Altering market 
incentives, reducing risks, offering entrepreneurial visions and managing conflicts 
are some of the functions of the developmental state” (Johnson, 1999, p.48). 
 
Much of Johnson’s work was aimed at laying out the instrumentality of the 
development state within the institutional context of Japanese economic history 
between the years 1925 and 1975. Some authors responding to Johnson have raised 
questions concerning the specificity of the conditions surrounding the 
developmental state both in terms of the uniqueness of the social and political 
setting and the peculiarity of the historical conjuncture which was conducive to the 
success of the developmental state.   
 
In addition it has been pointed out by other authors that identifying the instruments 
of state intervention in a period of high growth says nothing of the causal linkage 
 10
between industrial policy and industrial expansion.9 The evolution of the strategic 
state in other Asian countries like Korea has clearly illustrated that similar policies 
and institutions have also been associated with high growth periods. However, 
critics of the viability of the development state still argue that, since interventionist 
states have not worked in places like Latin America, either the success is linked to 
the common uniqueness of the region or historical period or that development has 
occurred in spite of the role of the state. For example, in line with the neo-classical 
literature on Asia, success has come from openness and an export orientation, 
macrostability and keeping prices right in spite of the intervention.   
 
To advance the issue of the potential role of the development state in Africa, one 
needs to carefully present sound theoretical reasons which would explain how the 
developmental state can deal with the challenges of the current reality of African 
economies. In other words, to confront the literature that misidentifies successful 
policies or argues that they that have been ineffective or linked to unique 
irreproducible conditions, one needs to carefully link cause and effect by presenting 
an economic theory of the developmental state.   
 
TOWARD AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL 
STATE 
To date, much of the literature on the developmental state has examined political or 
political economy dimensions. There have been comparatively few studies utilizing 
economic theory to explain the exigencies of the developmental state. Chang 
(1999) reminds us that the literature in economic development up to the 1970s, 
while not directly exploring the concept of the developmental state, focused on the 
need for intervention relative to a variety of developing country needs that could 
not be undertaken by the private sector alone. Much of the early discussion in the 
literature on economic development of the post-war period focused on the question 
of the context of the conditions which would perpetuate economic growth. In the 
classical model of Harrod and Domar, which dates back to their seminal 
contributions in the 40s, the sustainable or “warranted growth” rate is linked to the 
rate of savings and incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR). Sustainability in this 
model was narrowly defined along a knife edge since, if the rate of growth varied 
from the ratio of savings to ICOR, the economy could expand at a rate which 
would either ignite inflation (when it exceeded it) or unemployment  (when fell 
below).   
 
A model which predicted instability in market economies left neo-classical 
economists in a rather disturbed state. Solow (1956) broadened the conditions for 
steady-state growth by removing the Harrod-Domar world of fixed technical 
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relations to allow capital and labor to be completely interchangeable. This is the 
same approach that dominates most economic neo-classical economic thinking. If 
technical change and income shares are held constant, income per capita would be 
a product of the rate of savings divided by the rate of expansion of the fully 
employed labor force. The growth rate would be sustainable until diminishing 
returns set in. The Solow and Harrod-Domar models fell into the broad genre of 
capital-centered models of sustainable growth which dominated much of the 
literature through the sixties.  
 
Two somewhat divergent approaches came out of this literature. Following Harrod-
Domar and inspired by the high investment rates of the early Soviet era, there was a 
belief that the market by itself would not be able to maintain the warranted growth 
rate and that government planning and ownership was necessary to mobilize the 
resources for high levels of sustainable growth.  For example, Gershenkron (1962) 
argued that state involvement was needed for industrial financing on a scale which 
would ensure minimum efficiency in an era of ever-changing technology.  
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943, 1951) pointed to the indivisibilities problems that could 
be overcome and external economies that could be gained through a state-
coordinated “big push” in the early stages of development.     
 
Many of the early strategies in developing countries were dominated by policies 
which put more emphasis on state ownership and planning to achieve sustainable 
growth. This was due not only to the influence of the first view but also to the 
paucity of viable private sectors in many countries in the early stages of post-
colonialism with states filling the vacuum with the assistance of bilateral and 
multilateral aid.   
 
The second was the view inspired by Solow that sustainable growth would arise 
through the mobilization of savings and investment through the market system. In 
this vein, the literature was replete throughout the seventies with development 
writers like Deepak Lal, Ian Little, P.T. Bauer and Bela Ballasa attacking state-led 
development and blaming it for the lack of sustainable growth. Others aimed at not 
only being critical of the role of the state but in adding new dimensions to the neo-
classical growth model such as Mckinnon’s financial repression theory. Implicit in 
this literature was the notion that the state could not be the guardian of the public 
interest since it was replete with the neo-classical homo-economicus or self-seeking 
individual who would try to maximize their selfish economic and/or political gains. 
The way forward was through state retraction and removing the distortions created 
by state policies in order for the Solow world of sustainable growth to become 
operational. As we indicated above and elsewhere (Stein and Nissanke, 1999; 
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Stein, 1999), the neo-classical vision as manifested by structural adjustment has 
failed in Africa due precisely to the flawed theoretical nature of the adjustment 
model. One needs to go beyond the neo-classical theory of the state since it is based 
on the same flawed microfoundations that underlie the neo-classical view of 
markets. 
 
Based partly on the earlier non-neo-liberal development literature, Chang (1999) 
lays out four vital economic functions for a developmental state: co-ordination for 
change, provisions of vision, conflict management and institution building. These 
provide a useful way of organizing arguments concerning the exigencies of the 
developmental state.  
 
To begin with, Chang argues that the recent literature on technical change has 
confirmed the importance of co-ordination since if technology is embedded in a 
capital stock which is an interdependent network of components under divided 
ownership, then the adaptation of the old capital structures to new ones will be 
difficult and halting due to the varying costs and benefits to each agent. While it is 
possible that different groups with complementary investments could draw up 
contracts, the transaction costs of formulating and monitoring the contract among a 
large number of agents is likely to be prohibitive. Co-ordination of the indicative 
planning information type might be sufficient, although government financial 
incentives can often lead to the kinds of signaling that would encourage consistent 
investment and production. In this context, industrial policy can provide the overall 
framework for information and incentives. However, I would argue that the 
industrial policy must be embedded in the framework of civil society organizations 
both for information dissemination and legitimacy. This will be discussed in more 
detail below. 
 
A second function is to provide a vision from a low-equilibrium to a higher 
equilibrium state. Even if one is to accept the flawed neo-classical vision, as we 
saw above, the analyses focus on attaining static efficiency. As price signals are 
assumed to embody all necessary information, changes in relative prices are viewed 
as a critical prerequisite to a predictable shift to a new equilibrium state. However, 
the focus in development is creating dynamic efficiency or in Hirschmanian terms 
formulating new “choice sets” instead of trying to optimize within existing choice 
sets.  There is nothing in theory or reality that connects static efficiency gains to 
longer-term dynamic efficiency which is the product of complex institutional and 
structural transformation.  In the era of structural adjustment, African governments 
have been preoccupied with the ever-elusive goal of macrostabilization precisely 
because the economies have been structurally weak (Stein and Nissanke, 1999).   
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What is needed is a vision for the future which will provide a guide for the 
transformation of economies along a path that will be developmental. Stabilization 
in the sense of the ability to manage internal and external shocks is a product of and 
embedded in the growth of development and the development of growth. 
 
A third function of the developmental state is conflict management. Chang argues 
that economic development involves moving resources from low-productivity 
activities to higher ones. In the neo-classical world factors of production are 
perfectly mobile. However in the real world resources are immobile and the owners 
of existing resources might face obsolescence, unemployment and income losses.  
Those that have invested in the physical capital, skills and contractual relations 
might resist change leading to the potential for conflict. The developmental state 
can be of enormous assistance in mediating conflict including compensating 
potential losers. The compensation can improve investment in the long term by 
socializing risk in potentially immobile capital. 
 
A fourth function of the developmental state is institution building. This is very 
complicated and warrants a much longer discussion. 
 
The Developmental State and Institution Building   
While the World Bank has long recognized the role of the state in guaranteeing 
property rights, institution building is far more complex than neutrally protecting 
private property and contracts. Chang points to organizing institutions which are 
consistent with the entrepreneurial vision held by the state. He presents examples 
such as model factories and lifetime employment in Japan or the export monitoring 
system in Korea as indicators of the variation of different types of institutions.   
 
However, the institutional exigencies of the developmental state are much more 
complicated and aimed not only at meeting state visions but also for more general 
purposes. An economy is a system of inter-dependent institutions, and the 
government is regarded as a coherent and endogenous cluster of these institutions 
that, together with the private sector, constitute an economic system. Private agents 
and institutions as productive units such as industrial firms comprise the core of this 
economic system, the evolution of which proceeds primarily with the enhancement of 
organizational capabilities of firms and the expansion and deepening of inter-firm 
relationships. Markets are where coordination among decisions made by private 
agents should take place. The functioning of the system depends on the productive 
and organizational capacities of its constituent economic agents and the institutional 
arrangements governing the relationships among them.  
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The process of institutional development and learning, i.e. the strengthening of 
organizational capabilities of economic agents and market deepening is explicitly 
recognized as one of the critical aspects of economic development. Market deepening 
is interpreted here as the process of intensification of interactive interrelationships 
among agents and institutions, as individual agents undergo their own organizational 
evolution. It involves the development of institutional arrangements for network 
relationships among agents. This perception of markets is similar to that found in the 
institutional economics literature and, hence conceptually different from the 
perspective that underlines the conventional neo-classical paradigm10.  
 
As discussed above, markets in the neo-classical view, which underlies the vision of 
the Bank, are seen as a realm where rational atomistic individual agents interact in 
exchange of goods and services. Agents in their utility maximizing efforts merely 
respond to the prevailing incentive structure embedded mostly in relative price 
signals through competitive market interfaces. Institutions are exogenously given to 
the pricing system, which is the main coordinating mechanism, while exchanges 
involve no transaction costs. In contrast, institutional economics defines markets as 
broad institutional structures and arrangements that support and govern the process of 
exchange with an aim of minimizing transaction costs. It views both market and state 
as one of institutions that shape patterns of economic activities.  
 
Advancing the theory of imperfect information, Stiglitz (1989) also defines markets 
as an important set of institutions. More specifically, markets are viewed as 
institutionalized in environments characterized by imperfect, costly and incomplete 
information. Hence, it recognizes that market participants incur transaction costs. The 
theory further emphasizes that in order for markets to function properly, appropriate 
governance mechanisms and arrangements are required to eschew agency problems 
arising out of opportunistic behavior such as moral hazard and adverse incentives.  
 
Stiglitz’s theory of imperfect information is in many aspects quite comparable to the 
analysis advanced by such institutional economists as Coase and Williamson (Coase 
1992, Williamson 1985, 1995). They represent one end of the spectrum of the new 
institutional economics. 11 This school of new institutional economics adopts the neo-
classical choice theoretical approach as a starting point of its micro-economic 
analysis. However, it criticizes the neo-classical model for failing to include the role 
of transaction costs in exchange and in its inability to explain the role of institutions 
in the formation and operation of markets, minimizing transaction costs, and reducing 
uncertainty.  In their perspective, institutions are seen to be created and refined to deal 
with market failures, including those arising out of imperfect and costly information 
and agency and incentive problems. 
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However, the concept of market failure appears to be too restrictive to adequately 
address policy issues related to structural transformation. In our view, dynamic 
concepts of market transformation and market construction are needed to identify the 
real hindrances to structural transformation. In this respect, institutional economics as 
a whole has a much wider analytical scope: it embraces an interdisciplinary and 
historical approach to the examination of institutional and structural of economies. 
This approach emphasizes the micro-foundations of economies in their institutional 
environments and organizational governance structures and stresses the dynamic and 
evolutionary nature of economies (Toye 1995). 
 
In this dynamic framework, the sources for low-growth are associated with the 
inability of economies to transform institutional structures in response to new 
technological and market opportunities. Institutional economics can offer a coherent 
account of the institutional changes necessary for economic development, and hence 
a set of tools to inform the design of institutional and policy alternatives for structural 
transformation. 
 
This perspective is particularly pertinent to our quest for an appropriate theory of 
institutional and structural change aimed at enhancing the process of market 
transformation and capital accumulation. Analyzing markets as social institutions, 
North (1989) shows that markets have historically evolved and transformed over time 
in line with the increasing specialization and the expansion of the division of labor. 
With higher rates of return to the formalization of markets, long-term and multi-
contract impersonal exchanges have developed. However, market transformation 
does not necessarily automatically take place. For markets to transform and graduate 
to a higher stage, an appropriate institutional environment and governance structure 
should be developed to reduce uncertainties and transaction costs. 
 
As discussed in Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998a and b), private agents in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, operating in high-risk environments without effective insurance and credit 
markets, have used traditional social institutions and mechanisms, based on village 
and kin groups, as surrogates. These arrangements have provided informal social 
safety nets and redistributional mechanisms. They have served as social and 
economic stabilizers and have displayed a remarkable degree of resilience and 
dynamism.  
 
However, in the absence of functioning formal institutions, economic exchanges have 
been restricted to the interpersonal relations of small-scale production and local trade. 
Contract enforcement problems have been obviated through repeated dealing and 
cultural and social homogeneity. African economies appear to be locked into this low 
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developmental stage where "a dense social network leads to the development of fairly 
stable informal structures, such as customs, trust and normative rules which give an 
informal institutional framework for organising activities" (Aron 1997). 
 
One of the critical questions to be addressed in relation to African economic 
development is to create conditions where private agents operating in informal 
institutional arrangements feel prepared to move to more formal institutions more 
conducive to productive activities promising higher social and private returns. A key 
to this may be found in searching for ways and mechanisms to reduce the 
transformation risks and costs as well as transaction costs. This can be achieved only 
when African countries as nation states are able to commit to long-term investment in 
social, human and information capital to build institutional frameworks and 
endowments for sustainable development. 
 
An important dimension of institutions is how it affects human behavior. Beyond 
the flawed static acquisitive world of homo-economicus is recognition that the 
behavior of individuals is often linked to the roles that others expect them to play or a 
"typified response to a typified expectation". Closely linked to this concept is an 
institutionalist perception of human behavior as a product of "settled habits of thought 
common to the generality of men and women" (Veblen 1919, p.240). Perhaps a richer 
notion of the embedded being is captured by the concept of homo-sociologicus where 
individuals are not constantly calculating utility maximizers but live according to 
"rules, roles and relations" (Hargreaves-Heap et al. 1992, p.63). The existence of 
homo-sociologicus, which posits individuals as transformative social beings, must be 
connected to the broader domain of the institutional and structural transformation 
associated with development.   
 
Take the issue of entrepreneurship. The Bank and IMF hope that privatization and 
market reform will somehow stimulate a group of entrepreneurs just waiting for the 
opportunity to respond with investment and production. Here the architects of 
adjustment seem to be falling back on a Hayekian notion of entrepreneurs as risk 
takers or homo-economicus waiting to jump at opportunities created by the new 
climate.  However, at the heart of any thriving capitalist economy are not risk takers, 
which have always been in abundance in Africa, but Shumpeterian entrepreneurs who 
are inventors and innovators.  Entrepreneurship of this type thrives best in a fostering 
climate which includes research and development, highly trained human capital, 
access to finance etc, all of which are poorly developed and even eroded under 
adjustment.  It is in this embedded context that new rules, roles and relations will 
develop in a manner which enhances entrepreneurial activity.  A similar argument can 
be used to criticize the public choice view of the state.  Once one moves away from 
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perceiving all state officials as acquisitive beings always acting as neo-classical 
homo-economicus and recognizes them as transformative beings, then the question 
becomes one of designing an operating context where new roles, rules and relations 
are encouraged so the state acts in concert with developmental objectives.   
 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
The Model of the Successful Development State 
The recognition of the theoretical exigencies of an African development state says 
nothing of the pre-conditions that will allow it to operate effectively. The literature on 
failed and successful developmental states is large and diverse. Once one arrives at 
some model or consensus on what has constituted success, one must then compare 
them to the conditions in Africa to comprehend the transformative prerequisites for 
the development of the developmental state.  A quick representative survey is a useful 
starting point in understanding political economy issues. 
 
Vartiainen (1999) surveys the experience of four successful developmental states 
Japan, Korea, Finland and Austria, and finds six common stylized elements: 
 
1) a powerful and interventionist state  
2) extremely organized corporatist economies where strategic decision making has 
incorporated state and organized interest groups of workers and businesses 
3) political and collective decisions have helped channel savings into capital 
accumulation and mediated distributional conflicts around the distribution of income 
4) despite etatist planning the political establishment are committed to private 
property rights 
5) the state has been politically strong and endowed with a large competent 
bureaucracy 
6) the potential loss of sovereignty was present in each case since each country was 
situated between two ideological blocks. 
 
From these stylized facts the author proposes three determinants of success: 
 
1) A strong state in the sense that the bureaucracy is insulated from the logic of 
individual utility maximization such that the state apparatus must be bureaucratic and 
meritocratic enough to impose collective objectives on its members. 
2) The state must have thick ties to the economy’s organized agents such as industrial 
associations and trade unions e.g. the state must be embedded 
3) There needs to be mutual dependence or mutual balance between the state and the 
rest of the economy which entails a combination of discipline and privilege. An 
external challenge might help maintain this careful balance. 
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In contrast, Schneider (1999) examines the failed developmental states of Brazil and 
Mexico. He argues there were four common features of the “desarrollista” states 
political capitalism where profits and investment decisions are dependent on the state, 
an ideology of developmentalism which legitimized state intervention to promote 
industrialisation, political exclusion which limited pluralism either through military 
control or impediments to opposition and, finally, an appointed bureaucracy where 
the jobs of tens of thousands of bureaucrats are tied to political regimes. He argues 
the latter was the major impediment to the proper operation of the developmental 
state since the bureaucracy became a political player that is incapable of acting in an 
administrative Weberian manner.  
 
Herring (1999) argues that India had a successful bureaucracy which has recruited the 
brightest and maintained high meritocratic standards but was still a failed 
developmental state.  However, he argues that the main problem was with the manner 
in which the state was embedded with private capital. Private capital was highly 
fragmented and had difficulty bargaining as a single voice. The state had a generally 
negative view of capitalism but was approachable by individual capitalists.  What was 
important were school ties, family relations marriage alliances, common geography 
and even side-payments. In essence the embeddedness took a particularistic form 
which reduced the effectiveness of stated goals.   
 
These unsuccessful cases clearly contradict Vartiainen’s criteria of success. Despite 
the competence of the India state, it would appear not to have been sufficiently 
suffused with bureaucratic standards to operate properly. Similarly, the Latin America 
bureaucracies behaved very differently. In India’s case, it also lacked the thickness of 
ties to organized private sector agents and a sufficient respect for the private sector’s 
abilities. 
 
Africa and the Developmental State: Beyond the Impossibility Thesis 
At first glance it is evident that most African countries lack many of the elements 
needed for a successful developmental state. Bureaucracies are extremely weak and 
at least in the past anti-capitalist in their rhetoric, private sectors poorly organized 
and fragmented and state-business relations poorly developed. This has been 
recognized by a number of writers including the World Bank. However, the 
question becomes: is it possible to build a development state in Africa and if so 
how can this be achieved.   
 
In recent years, there has been an extensive literature generating an “impossibility 
theses”(Mkandawire, 1998).  In this literature, it is argued, the African state cannot 
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become developmental because of its lack of ideology, its dependency, its softness 
and its associated proneness to capture by special interests, its lack of technical and 
analytical capacity, the changing international environment that limits the tools of 
industrial policy like protectionism and the poor record of past intervention. The 
framework in which this discussion is presented provides a useful taxonomy to 
challenge the impossibility thesis and to begin to better understand the possibility 
of a developmental state in Africa. 
 
On the first issue, there is strong evidence of developmentalism as an ideology 
among early African leaders. In practice however, much of the effort focused on 
the politics of nation building. Today, there is more of a focus on the economics of 
nation building among the leadership, although ominously much of it is focused on 
attracting foreign capital combined with a rather jaundiced view of the potential 
role of domestic capital. However, more hopefully, the leadership’s critique of 
elements of structural adjustment such as its neglect of public goods and human 
capital development is based not on attempts to maintain rent seeking privilege as 
suggested by the IFIs, but out of genuine developmental considerations  
(Mkandawire, 1998).    
 
Perhaps what is missing is not a commitment to economic growth and development 
but a concatenating vision of an alternative strategy. An additional barrier arises 
with the IFIs which, despite the rhetoric, are still committed to a core neo-liberal 
model which precludes the implementation of any alternative. As I have suggested 
above and elsewhere, despite the arguments by the neo-classically trained 
economists in the Bank and Fund that there is no alternative to adjustment, there 
are other models that have not been tried in Africa and are well grounded 
theoretically.   
 
Second, the history of the dependency literature illustrates how the argument on the 
impossibility of full-fledged capitalist development in the periphery has given way 
to dependent development thesis. This has occurred in recognition of the growth in 
the developing Asian countries and the Warren (1980) critique of the falsity of the 
underdevelopment or socialism dichotomy. In the other extreme Sender and 
Smith’s (1986) argument that colonialism and imperialism did not stunt capitalism 
is also not compelling or accurate.   
 
The point from the dependency literature is not that development is impossible but, 
as I have argued elsewhere (Stein, 1985), colonialism in Africa contributed little to 
the development of capitalism and in many countries impeded the expansion of 
indigenous private sectors. Four decades after colonialism, the institutions, 
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infrastructure, and social overhead capital are still woefully inadequate relative to 
those needed even in the earliest stages of capitalist development. While structural 
adjustment might have weakened some of these elements, its greatest crime is its 
misplaced focus on the ever elusive and largely failed goal of balancing financial 
variables while ignoring these fundamental prerequisites for African 
development.12 The result is two lost decades which has seen a steady erosion of 
these fundamentals often due to benign neglect (perhaps with malignant 
implications). Any developmental state must begin with a careful assessment of the 
current state of developmental assets and how they can be transformed for broader 
developmental objectives. 
 
Third, the literature on the lack of an autonomous African state can be divided into 
neo-patrimonialism and rent-seeking arguments. Market and government failures 
are linked in the neo-patrimonial literature to societal weaknesses where all market 
and government activities are permeated by familial relations, prebendalism and 
clientalism. The problem with this literature is it uses neo-patrimonial reasoning to 
explain almost every imaginable outcome such as import substitution, parastatals, 
privatization etc. In the process of trying to explain everything it explains very 
little. What is not clear in this literature is whether this is a permanent phenomenon 
or one that is part of a phase (Mkandawire, 1998). Moreover, the same neo-
patrimonial or crony capitalist arguments are now being used to explain the Asian 
crisis. At the same time the close linkage between the state and the private sector 
has been interpreted by some authors like Evans (1995) as an important part of 
embeddedness that allowed developmental states to be successful. What is not clear 
is how Asia’s neo-patrimonialism was able to accomplish enormous growth and 
development for decades while Africa’s wasn’t.  
 
Fourth, public choice and rational choice arguments by Bates and others argue that 
state policies are a product of groups or individuals pushing it to generate rents for 
these groups or individuals. Since rents are defined as an outcome that is different 
from some hypothetical competitive pareto optimal point which has never existed 
in reality, any state policy leads to rent redistribution not necessarily rent creation. 
What is important is not removing some hypothetical distortion to get rid of rents 
which has been one of the flawed theoretical goals of adjustment but ensuring that 
the rents go to productive not unproductive purposes.  One mechanism used in Asia 
is to implement a system of contingent rents whereby higher than expected profits 
are provided to the private sector in return for investment and production in 
economically useful areas.   
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While the concept of rents is a flawed one since it uses a base of comparison that 
only exists in the mind of a neo-classical economist, the notion that states can 
intervene by assuming risk and improving the prospects of profitability is a central 
one in pinpointing the instrumentality of any developmental state. Akyuz (1996) 
points to five reasons why the Asia experience with rents was successful at building 
industrialization: rents were given in response to activities which served national 
interest; rent seeking costs such as information collection, influence peddling 
bargaining were kept low, governments closed off non-productive avenues for 
wealth accumulation like real estate; rents were provided on a selective and 
temporary basis and withdrawn once industries matured sufficiently to compete 
internationally and rent realization was linked to explicit performance standards.  
 
Fifth, the impossibility literature is also the result of a misreading of African 
economic history. The view is that state intervention in Africa was a disaster prior 
to 1980 and therefore should not be attempted again. The Berg report, which 
characterized African economies as economic disasters due to state intervention, 
was a highly misleading characterization of the pre-80 period. To begin with, there 
were high levels of accomplishments in growth, savings and investment rates.  
Much of the state-led development aimed policies like import-substitution was not 
a product of rent-seeking activities but a reflection as we discussed above of the 
development thinking of the era and the weak state of the local bourgeoisie.   
 
While the state had some developmental tendencies, the developmental state was 
never properly implemented. To begin with a state was not embedded with little or 
no representation of local business classes in policy making. Moreover, the irony of 
the pre-adjustment period was that it emphasized the same static comparative 
advantage as the adjustment period, one that was monocultural and land-intensive.  
It had no strategy of the type used by development states in Asia to create new 
comparative advantages through the structural transformation of exports.   
 
A sixth issue is the impact of the new global order on the tools available today to 
any developmental state compared to the 70s or 80s. Under the rules of the new 
WTO, it is argued that protection of industries, export promotion subsidies and 
financial repression might not be available as options. To begin with there are 
many measures such as institution building that are part of the projects of the 
developmental state and have nothing to do with the WTO. Moreover, given that 
nobody really understands the meaning of much of the fine print of the agreement, 
developing countries have different provisions than developing countries, almost 
all the current complaints to the WTO have been concerned with trade between 
developed countries, given the small production and markets of developing 
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countries and the lengthy and costly nature of the proceedings on each case, it 
would extremely defeatist not to attempt to use some of these measures. Up to 
April 1999, not a single sub-Saharan African country was involved in the WTO 
trade dispute mechanism (Stein, 2000). Even if ultimately some policies are 
challenged, this could take many years which would provide a significant short 
term or medium term benefits to industries.   
 
The final issue is the question of the absence in Africa of the competence needed in 
any developmental state. As we discussed above, the early focus of the structural 
adjustment has been to retract the state in the belief that a smaller state was a better 
state and this would free up scarce resources for the private sector. Unfortunately 
this policy has further weakened the state which has strengthened the claims that 
the state is too incompetent to be developmental. Moreover, as pointed out by many 
African leaders, what is left of the state is highly distorted since it is aimed at 
fulfilling the informational obligations and mostly financial policy aims of the IFIs 
and the bilateral donors.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 The paper began with a critique of the misconceptualization of the concept of the 
state embedded in structural adjustment. The focal point in the orthodox approach 
has been on the creation of the minimalist state which arises out of a faulty 
dichotomous state-market construct where state failures are paramount. This 
position arises from the public choice/rational choice school which presents states 
as predatory-rent generating institution that inhibits the efficient allocation of 
resources.  
 
The micro foundations of this approach to the state can be found in neo-classical 
economics that assumes that private sector actors in markets are rational and react 
in an efficient manner if price signals are correct. If economies are not operating at 
optimal levels, it is because of the influence of extra-market forces. This invariably 
leads to a reactive role of the state. In its pure general equilibrium form, there is no 
role for the state. In a more relaxed version, more commonly used by neo-classical 
economists, there is the recognition that exchanges lead to property right transfers.  
They also require a means of payment. Thus, states are needed to support 
exchanges through juridical and monetary institutions. Any intervention beyond 
these roles cannot be justified on economic grounds. Beyond this acquisitive homo-
economicus will use the state for predatory purposes.   
 
Structural adjustment strategies have adopted this view.  Inefficiencies have arisen 
due to state ownership and the regulation of production. They have created 
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distortions in exchange rates, interest rates, commodities prices and wage rates.  
Enormous static efficiency gains can arise through the reversal of this intervention 
via liberalization, stabilization and privatization.   
 
The pattern of the 1980s was for the IFIs to tie tranches allocations to civil service 
retrenchment targets.  In the process of implementing state minimalism, there is a 
rather faulty belief that cutting back on bloated bureaucracies both retracts the 
distorting influence of state intervention and frees up scarce human resources that 
would be more efficiently used by the private sector. By 1989, the Bank’s 
retrenchment approach was abandoned as an abysmal failure. A new approach 
aimed at capacity building and governance was introduced. However, this has also 
been conceptually flawed with serious implementation problems.   
 
As opposed to the World Bank/neo-classical approach to the state, the paper 
investigated the theory of the developmental state. To avoid some of the limitations 
that are associated with institutional descriptions that might be linked to the 
specificity of conditions in a particular historical moment and therefore not 
reproducible, the paper presented an economic theory of the developmental state.  
The analysis begins with a brief retracing of the literature in growth and 
development in the post-war period. One approach, linked to the work of Robert 
Solos, is a precursor to the neo-classical development economics literature of the 
1960s and 70s. A second approach recognizes that growth and development in the 
Harrod-Domar tradition is narrowly defined along a knife’s edge that will require 
state intervention for sustainability.  It is the latter approach that directly underlies 
the economic theory of the developmental state.   
 
Along these lines, four vital functions were discussed including coordination for 
change provisions of vision, conflict management and institution building. The 
exigencies of the African developmental state says nothing of its preconditions for 
operating effectively. The final section of the paper turned to this question by 
examining a series of broad political economy issues including the linkages 
between a successful developmental state and the economy’s organized agents.  
Finally the paper critically examined the arguments in the literature contrary to the 
possibility of a developmental state in Africa. 
 
The IFIs have discovered in recent years the concept of state capacity building.  
The question becomes capacity for what purposes. These capacities must go 
beyond trying to reproduce American-style independent central banks into creating 
the professional bureaucracies that can manage the broad policy exigencies of the 
developmental state in African countries. The challenges ahead are multifaceted 
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and multileveled. There will be potholes, wrong turns and reversals on the road to 
the development of the developmental state in Africa. For it to be legitimate, the 
design of the road must come from the users of the new highway. However, even a 
bumpy path forward will be an improvement over the rut that Africa has been in 
under the adjustment policies of the past two decades. 
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3There are problems with the consistency between the subcomponents of these neo-classical 
microfoundations. It has been widely recognized as early as the 30s by people like Oskar 
Morgenstern and Friedrich Hayek, that equilibrium was not consistent with instrumental or 
substantive rationality due to self-referential problems. The argument was that any rational agent 
will base their decisions partly on the expectations or predictions of what other agents will do, 
but their predictions will be based partly on what the first agent will do and so on. This creates a 
self-referential problem which leads to an infinite regress, a vicious circle or a dogmatic 
interruption. Thus there is no consistent, non-contradictory or non ad hoc solution. A good 
discussion of these issues is found in Knudsen (1993). 
4 The literature on economic methodology has become very rich in recent decades. It has become 
widely recognized that neo-classical economics almost never practices Popperian falsificationism 
and has a core set of propositions that are never altered in the face of counter evidence. Some have 
explained this in terms of Lakatos' work on the methodology of scientific research programmes 
which consists of a hard core of metaphysical irrefutable propositions, positive heuristics which 
provide instructions on what tools and questions should be selected and which should be avoided 
and finally a protective belt of theories, empirical conventions and auxiliary hypotheses. For 
example, Weintraub has interpreted general equilibrium theory in these terms. Hard core 
propositions are that agents optimize, have preferences and act independently.  Heuristics encourage 
researchers to focus on theories where agents optimize while avoiding those involving 
disequilibrium. The protective belt of the neo-Walrasian program is found in the realm of applied 
microeconomics. Theoretical progression occurs when the theory predicts some novel unexpected 
facts while empirical progression occurs when apparently extraneous content is finally corroborated. 
A failure to pursue this mode of inquiry implies that a research program is degenerating theoretically 
and empirically. There have been widespread challenges to this depiction. For instance Hands 
(1993) argues that Lakatos' approach does not provide any guidance for the acceptance or rejection 
of economic theories. Knudsen (1993) argues that there seems to be little evidence that economics is 
in a crisis because it has failed to meet the test of progression. Less convincingly, Hausman (1994) 
argues that using Lakatos's categories hides the fact that most neo-classicals share many aspects 
which are not shared by all neo-classical works. However this is a definitional problem. Even 
Hausman admits there are common elements such as methodological individualism. For our 
purposes we stand by this section's common set of core neo-classical subcomponents underlying 
adjustment theories outlined. Perhaps the more interesting question is posed by Rosenberg (1994) 
which is why economists continue to use such a cognitively poor set of core propositions. He 
suggests the reasons are normative e.g. general equilibrium theory illustrates how self-interest ought 
to lead to a coherent disposition of resources and mathematical e.g. like Eucludian geometry it 
provides an axiomatic system which can explain some phenonoma for reasons that have little to do 
with its microfoundations e.g. higher prices lead to lower demand. Rosenberg correctly warns that 
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the current state of economics creates "a vacuum in the foundations of public policy", something that 
has happened in Africa under adjustment. 
 
5 There are a plethora of examples in mainstream economics of the impact of this methodology. 
In the face of empirical studies which challenge fundamental theories, economists try to generate 
alternative studies to present countervailing evidence to support the theories, new explanations 
that are aimed at rescuing theories or they are simply ignored. For example the Leontief paradox 
spawned a huge literature aimed at rescuing the factor endowment theory of international trade 
(see for instance Robert Baldwin's introduction of natural resources and crude measurements of 
human capital to try to counter the paradox). However, despite a problematic empirical base 
Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson is still presented as a core theory in international trade. An example 
closer to the discussions in this section can be found in the literature on expected utility theory.  
There are nine axioms underlying instrumentally rational choice under uncertainty. The axioms 
are needed to show that individuals acting on a preference ordering that satisfy them can be seen 
as acting in a manner which maximizes expected utility. The mode of human behavior (carefully 
calculating and ranking alternative bundles of goods in a completely consistent manner) implied 
by these axioms is in itself absurd. Moreover, many of these are challenged by experimental 
observations such as the Allais' paradox, Ellsberg's paradox, preference reversal and Newcomb's 
problem. In order to maintain the theory which is so widely used in the mainstream journals, 
many economists dismiss the observations in a number of ways. Some argue the theory is 
normative and therefore cannot be directly challenged (e.g. this is the way they ought to act even 
if some people do not act in this manner). However, this is not terribly cogent, not only because 
of the problems with dichotomizing the normative and the positive in economics, but also 
because it would imply that all the neo-classical models which use expected utility would be 
concerned with how the economy ought to be rather than how it actually operates (e.g. nothing 
but speculation). Others argue that the theories predict behavior in the aggregate so that variations 
cancel each other out. However there is no evidence that the paradoxes are random events which 
would make this explanation cogent. Finally, still others dismiss the observations since they have 
not been gathered from real world choices or that the stakes are not high enough in the 
experiments or once the actions are repeated people will become more rational and behave like 
the model. All of these positions are nothing but assertions arising from an axiomatic attachment 
to a core set of propositions needed to maintain the logical integrity of neo-classical economics.  
A good discussion of many of these issues can be found in Hargreaves Heap et al. (1992). 
 
6 Proponents of new institutional economics have a related concept. North sees the state as an 
organization with a comparative advantage in violence. This is important if it is to enforce property 
rights since "the essence of property rights is the right to exclude and an organization which has a 
comparative advantage in violence is in the position to specify and enforce property rights." (North 
1981, p.21). 
 
7 A good critique of these concepts is presented by Moore (1993). 
 
8 Johnson is highly dismissive of the Bank’s miracle report “The study does not actually say 
anything new and is intentionally misleading on fundamentals…” (Johnson, 1999, p.35). 
 
9 For example Calder (1993) argues that private sector activities not state strategies were 
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responsible for Japanese post-war success. Johnson is very critical of the depictions which try to 
separate private and public sectors in a manner which reflects the little boxes of American 
political scientists rather than the reality of Japanese practices. Calder misinterprets the Industrial 
Bank of Japan as the agent of corporate-led strategic capitalism. In reality it was a government 
organ up to 1952 when the allies forced them to privatize and thereafter was closely linked to the 
priorities of the government’s industrial policy. A discussion of the quasi-public nature of the 
long-term industrial bank is presented in Stein (2001, in press).   
 
10 For a summary discussion how these issues are treated in the Market Enhancing View and 
Institutional Economics, see Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998a).  
 
11 According to Harriss et al. (1995) and Stein (1995a), there are two schools of institutionalism in 
economics: the old institutional economics and the new institutional economics. In contrast to the 
position taken by the latter school, the old institutional economics rejects the neoclassical 
assumption of rational-maximizing atomistic agents and takes organizations and entities, operating 
in a complex historically specific environment of social, economic and legal institutions, as unit of 
analysis. 
 
12 I have argued elsewhere, that even in the context of its own criteria adjustment has been a 
failure.  For example average inflation rates have actually been statistically higher and rising in 
the adjustment period in Africa.  See (Stein, 1999). 
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